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Role of Regulation in Minimizing Terrorist Threats 
Against the Food Supply: Information, Incentives, 
and Penalties 
Michael T. Roberts* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ringing alarm bells as he announced his resignation as 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, 
Tommy Thompson posited: “I, for the life of me, cannot 
understand why the terrorists have not . . . attacked our food 
supply because it is so easy to do.”1  The seeming ease of a 
terrorist attack on the United States food supply evokes the 
obvious question of what steps should be taken to minimize the 
threat.  Determining what steps should be taken and 
implementing those steps naturally turns our attention to the 
government’s important role in protecting the safety of the 
nation’s food supply from terrorist attacks. 
The government’s role in protecting the safety of the 
nation’s food supply has historically depended on two factors: 
first, incremental legislation and regulation in response to 
specific problems, and second, effective coordination and 
cooperation among regulatory authorities and other public and 
private stakeholders.  These factors remain the same even 
when the government is responding to terrorist threats against 
©   2007 Michael T. Roberts. 
       *    Michael T. Roberts is an attorney in the Washington D.C. office of 
Venable LLP and a member of the firm’s agriculture and food law practice 
group.  He is a former Research Professor of Law at the University of 
Arkansas School of Law and Director of the National Agricultural Law Center.  
He practices in the area of domestic and international food law and lectures 
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 1. Mike Allen, Rumsfeld to Remain at Pentagon; Thompson Quits HHS, 
Warns of Vulnerabilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2004, at A1. 
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the food supply.  While the government has passed legislation 
and has taken specific steps to minimize the threat of food 
terrorism, it also relies upon a food regulatory system 
dependent upon effective cooperation and coordination among 
public and private stakeholders.2 
Measuring the effectiveness of the government’s response 
to the threat of food terrorism is not easy.  Much has been 
written about the role of government regulation in reducing 
health risks.3  Rather than devise a regulatory construct 
specifically to address the threat of food terrorism, this article 
evaluates the government’s efforts, within the existing 
regulatory construct, to minimize the risk of food terrorism by 
focusing on the effectiveness of the government’s use of three 
regulatory tools: information, incentives, and penalties.  This 
article concludes that there are inherent limitations and 
weaknesses of the food regulatory system. 
II. SETTING THE TABLE 
It has long been recognized that the government is 
responsible for ensuring the safety of the food supply.4  This 
responsibility stems from the government’s overall role in 
protecting the public health.5  This role is buttressed by rulings 
from the Supreme Court pronouncing that the preservation of 
public health is the most important duty of the state as a 
sovereign power.6  Since September 11, 2001, this role has 
focused more sharply on abating the threat of terrorist activity 
against the nation’s food supply.7 
 2. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet:  
Strengthening the Security of Our Nation’s Food Supply (July 6, 2004), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0453.shtm. 
 3. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993) (exploring the difficulties that plague the 
efforts of government regulation to reduce health risk and proposing a new, 
centralized agency); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON:  SAFETY, LAW, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT (2002) (employing cost-benefit analysis to addressing 
government regulation to protect safety and the environment). 
 4. PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD & DRUG LAW 1 
(1991). 
 5. See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the "Old" Public 
Health: The Legal Framework for the Regulation of Public Health 1-4 (John M. 
Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 170, 2002), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_151-175/170-rae.old-public-
health.pdf (describing governmental public health approaches). 
 6. See Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 7. JIM MONKE, AGROTERRORISM: THREATS AND PREPAREDNESS CRS-1 
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A. DEFINING FOOD TERRORISM 
“Food terrorism” is defined, by a World Health 
Organization (WHO) report, as “an act or threat of deliberate 
contamination of food for human consumption with chemical, 
biological or radionuclear agents for the purpose of causing 
injury or death to civilian populations and/or disrupting social, 
economic, or political stability.”8  In a similar vein, a 
Congressional Research Service report to Congress defines 
“agroterrorism” as “the deliberate introduction of an animal or 
plant disease with the goal of generating fear, causing economic 
losses, and/or undermining stability.”9 
Historically, food terrorism includes the deliberate 
sabotage of military and civilian food supplies, primarily during 
military campaigns, via the intentional contamination of food 
by chemical, biological, or radionuclear agents.10 More recent 
non-military examples include the Rajneeshee cult, which 
contaminated Oregon salad bars with Salmonella typhimurium 
in an attempt to influence a local election in 1984.11  In 1996 a 
disgruntled laboratory worker infected food with Shigella 
dysenteria type two.12  Attacks against agriculture also have a 
long history, with many countries developing agricultural 
bioweapons programs during the twentieth century.13 
The WHO report demonstrates the potential impact of food 
terrorism on human health by extrapolating from numerous 
documented examples of unintentional outbreaks of food borne 
disease.14  In the United States, these include a 1985 outbreak 
of Salmonella typhimurium infection that affected 170,000 
people, caused by contamination of pasteurized milk from a 
(Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32521, Aug. 
13, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32521.pdf. 
 8. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TERRORIST 
THREATS TO FOOD:  GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING AND STRENGTHENING 
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE SYSTEMS 4 (2002), available at 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/general/en/terrorist.pdf. 
 9. MONKE, supra note 7, at CRS-1. 
 10. See FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 8. 
 11. PETER CHALK, HITTING AMERICA’S SOFT UNDERBELLY:  THE 
POTENTIAL THREAT OF DELIBERATE BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S. 
AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD INDUSTRY 29 (2004).  See also FOOD SAFETY DEP’T., 
supra note 8, at 5. 
 12. See CHALK, supra note 11, at 29. 
 13. MONKE, supra note 7, at CRS-5. 
 14. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 8, at 5. 
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dairy plant and a 1994 outbreak of Salmonella enteritidis 
infection that affected 224,000 people in forty-one states, 
caused by contaminated pasteurized liquid ice cream. The ice 
cream was contaminated via the inadvertent contamination of 
the pre-mix in tanker trucks.15  Aside from the human health 
toll, the potential impact of food terrorism on the social, 
economic, and political stability of the United States is 
enormous.16 
B. UNDERSTANDING THE FOOD SUPPLY SYSTEM 
Two aspects of the U.S. food supply system make it 
difficult to minimize acts or threats of deliberate 
contamination.  First, the food supply system encompasses a 
multi-faceted production and delivery system of food products, 
commonly referred to as a “farm-to-table” or “farm-to-plate” 
system.17  Essential system components include the production, 
processing, preparing, packaging, labeling, distribution, and, of 
course, consumption of food.18  At each of these stages, food 
products may be exposed to various levels of risk.19  Food can 
be contaminated deliberately by chemical, biological, or 
radionuclear agents at any stage of the food supply system.20  
The complexity of this system renders it difficult for a 
regulatory system to address the numerous risk points.21 
Second, the food supply system is increasingly global.22  
Food is the subject of an international distribution chain that 
involves a wide variety of entities from small local companies to 
multinational companies, from exporters to retailers.23  Much 
 15. Id. 
 16. CHALK, supra note 11, at 4, 19-26. 
 17. See Robert V. Tauxe, Linking Illnesses to Foods:  A Conceptual 
Framework, in TOWARD SAFER FOOD:  PERSPECTIVES ON RISK AND PRIORITY 
SETTING 47 (Sandra A. Hoffman & Michael R. Taylor, eds., 2005). 
 18. See INST. OF MEDICINE & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE 
FOOD FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 25 (1998). 
 19. See Tauxe, supra note 17, at 47 (“[t]he issue is complex: there are 
many chemical and biological hazards, many foods, and many points from 
farm to table at which microbes or other hazards can enter foods, and where 
microbes can multiply or be eliminated.”). 
 20. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 8, at 11. 
 21. See generally INST. OF MEDICINE & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 18, at 25-49 (overview of the complex, current U.S. food safety system). 
 22. See Anita Regmi & Mark Gehlhar, Processed Food Trade Pressured by 
Evolving Global Supply Chains, AMBER WAVES (Feb. 2005). 
 23. See id. 
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of this international development is driven by consumers who 
increasingly demand various types of food year-round.24  A 
global food supply system renders governance difficult where 
national regulatory regimes approach regulation differently 
and where these regimes are limited in ensuring the safety of 
food produced and processed beyond national borders.25 
Considering the complexities and broad scope of the food 
supply system, the role of protecting food from acts or threats of 
deliberate contamination is daunting.  For example, the 
contamination of food in one country can directly affect health 
in other parts of the world.26  In 1989, staphylococcal food 
poisoning in the United States was caused by mushrooms 
canned in China.27  In 1996 and 1997, cyclosporiasis outbreaks 
in the United States were linked to consumption of 
Guatemalan raspberries.28  A more recent example is the 2003 
outbreak of hepatitis in Pennsylvania, North Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Georgia caused by green onions imported from 
Mexico.29 
III. RESPONSE OF U.S. FOOD REGULATORY SYSTEM TO 
TERRORISM 
A. FOOD SAFETY REGULATORY SYSTEM 
The existing United States food regulatory system has 
developed piecemeal over the last century, generating new 
rules and regulations in response to emerging food problems.30  
As a result, the regulatory system is complicated and plagued 
by gaps, overlaps, and inconsistencies.31  Its fragmented legal 
 24. See Michael R. Taylor, Lead or React? A Game Plan for Modernizing 
the Food Safety System in the United States, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 400 
(2004). 
 25. See Caroline Smith DeWaal, Rising Imports, Bioterrorism, and the 
Food Supply, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 433, 438-39 (2004). 
 26. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra  note 8, at 5. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 5-6. 
 29. See LINDA CALVIN ET AL., ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, U. S. DEP’T 
OF AGRIC., THE ECONOMICS OF FOOD SAFETY:  THE CASE OF GREEN ONIONS 
AND HEPATITIS A OUTBREAK, (Dec. 2004), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/vgs/nov04/VGS30501/VGS30501.pdf. 
 30. Timothy M. Hammonds, It Is Time to Designate a Single Food Safety 
Agency?, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 427, 427 (2004). 
 31. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GAO-04-588T, FEDERAL 
FOOD SAFETY AND SECURITY SYSTEM:  FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING IS 
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP 2-3 (March 2004), 
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and organizational structure allocates to various government 
agencies differing responsibilities for specific food 
commodities.32  The numbers tell the story.  The safety and 
quality of the food supply is governed by thirty principal laws 
administered by fifteen agencies,33 twenty-eight House and 
Senate subcommittees that oversee food safety,34 and more 
than eighty-five state and 3,000 local regulatory agencies that 
license and inspect retail food establishments under various 
state laws and regulations.35 
Within this system the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) have most of the regulatory responsibilities.36  The 
FDA has jurisdiction over all “food” under the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.37  The USDA, through its Food Safety 
and Inspection Service (FSIS) agency, has jurisdiction over 
products containing more than “small amounts” of meat, 
poultry, and processed egg products under the Federal Meat 
Inspection Act and Poultry Products Inspection Act.38  The 
USDA, through its other agencies, also has jurisdiction over the 
primary agriculture production. 
The legal standards promulgated under this federal system 
include two basic standards: food must not be adulterated or 
misbranded.39  This means that food products must be safe and 
the labeling of food products must not be false or misleading. 
The regulatory driver for food safety standards for both 
FDA and USDA has been a collective group of regulations 
called “good manufacturing practices” (GMPs).  GMPs are 
standards that were adopted as regulations for food processing 
and handling following consultations with industry, experts, 
the public, and other interested parties and after rigorous 
available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04588t.pdf. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. at 2. 
 34. INST. OF MEDICINE & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 26. 
 35. DONNA U. VOGT, FOOD SAFETY ISSUES IN THE 109TH CONGRESS CRS-11 
(Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL31853, Feb. 4, 
2005), available at http://kuhl.house.gov/UploadedFiles/foodsafety.pdf. 
 36. GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 3. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (2000); 
Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 602 (2000); Poultry Products 
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 452; Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1032 
(2000). 
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notice and comment periods.40  In the 1990s, the FDA and the 
USDA also adopted a preventive approach to ensure the safety 
of food called the “Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point” 
(HACCP) system.41  As a uniform science-based approach to 
food safety, HACCP is predicated upon seven basic principles 
and applies a technical analysis of the food production process 
carried out by the food plant itself.42 
Despite the seeming simplicity of the legal standards 
governing the food supply, the respective regulatory approaches 
of the USDA and the FDA are markedly divergent.43  The 
USDA’s regulatory approach is predicated upon continuous 
inspection and prior approval.44  The FDA’s regulatory 
approach is predicated upon random inspection and 
enforcement in the marketplace.45  Also, the USDA 
traditionally has had more enforcement authority and 
resources than the FDA.46  Much has also been made of the 
different food safety philosophies of the FDA and the USDA.47  
In their frequent plant inspections, USDA inspectors use sight, 
smell, and touch to detect food safety problems.48  In contrast, 
FDA inspectors rarely inspect food facilities and focus more on 
evaluating the entire food production process within an 
establishment.49  There is also the problem of demarcating the 
regulatory authority of these two agencies for food facilities and 
food products that fall under the jurisdiction of both agencies.  
Famous examples include pizza and soup products, both of 
which contain ingredients that may fall under the jurisdiction 
of either the FDA or multiple USDA agencies.50  Another 
classic example is the deli whose closed-face and open-face 
sandwiches may be regulated by the FDA and the USDA, 
respectively.51 
 40. VOGT, supra note 35, at 7. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 3. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Robin J. Strongin, How Vulnerable Is the Nation’s Food Supply?  
Linking Food Safety and Food Security, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, MAY 17, 
2002, at 5, available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/IB773_FoodSafety_5-17-
02.pdf. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 5. 
 51. Id. at 7-8. 
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Key to effective regulation within this complex and 
fragmented food regulatory system is interagency cooperation 
and cooperation between these agencies and public and private 
stakeholders.  Evidence of interagency cooperation is provided 
by the more than fifty interagency agreements entered into by 
the federal agencies to govern their combined food safety 
oversight responsibilities.52  The FDA and the USDA have 
signed several Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) that 
encompass dual jurisdiction establishments, food additive 
petitions, and others.53  For years, federal and state agencies 
have also coordinated in an effort to protect the food supply.54  
This coordination extends to industry, where trade associations 
composed of food producers, processors, ingredient suppliers, 
retailers, and service establishments form model policies and 
support programs to help members enhance food safety and 
meet regulatory requirements.55  Other groups, such as 
consumer organizations, professional organizations, and 
academic organizations play important roles in promoting food 
safety, researching food safety technology, and in training and 
education.56 
B.  INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The emergence of the global food system makes the 
regulation of food produced, processed, and handled beyond 
U.S. boundaries critical.57  Three important international 
considerations stand out: inspecting importation of food 
products into the United States, regulating food safety in other 
countries, and setting international food safety standards. 
The increasing levels of imported foods have severely taxed 
the ability of federal agencies to ensure safety.58  In a March 
2004 hearing of the House Appropriation Committee’s 
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. Hearing before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. and Agency Org. of the H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Robert E. Brackett, 
Ph.D., Dir. of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition), available at  
http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/foodsafety0330.html. 
 54. See Stuart M. Pape et al., Food Security Would Be Compromised by 
Combining the Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Into a Single Food Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 405, 414 (2004). 
 55. INST. OF MEDICINE & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 31. 
 56. Id. at 32. 
 57. See generally id. at 46. 
 58. See DeWaal, supra note 25, at 436. 
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Subcommittee on Agriculture, acting FDA Deputy 
Commissioner Lester Crawford acknowledged that “[t]he FDA 
is overwhelmed by imports, which have increased five-fold 
since 1994.”59  The interdependence of the FDA, the USDA, and 
the United States Customs Service created communication 
problems and has historically challenged federal efforts to 
guard the safety of imported food.60  For example, food refused 
entry by the FDA reportedly may have been allowed into 
commerce by the Customs Service.61 
Absent the ability to inspect every single imported food 
product, protecting the United States food supply depends on 
the safety efforts of other countries.  Other countries, including 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, 
have made efforts to reform decentralized and fragmented food 
safety systems.62 
In addition to national food safety regimes, various 
international bodies set international standards for food safety.  
These international organizations include the WHO, which is 
actively engaged in numerous food safety initiatives;63 the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
which serves as a useful gateway to feed and food safety 
information;64 and the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which 
as a subsidiary body of the WHO and FAO, develops standards, 
codes of practice, and guidelines for food commodities.65  The 
World Trade Organization (WTO), based on the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
 59. See DeWaal, supra note 25, at 436 (quoting Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Agriculture of the H. Comm. On Appropriations, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (Statement of Lester M. Crawford, D.V.M., Ph.D., Deputy 
Commissioner for the Food and Drug Administration)). 
 60. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GAO/T-RCED-98-271, 
FOOD SAFETY—WEAK AND INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED CONTROLS ALLOW 
UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD TO ENTER U.S. COMMERCE 7-8 (Sept. 10, 1998), 
available at http://www.gao/gov/archive/1998/rc9827t.pdf. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-05-212, FOOD 
SAFETY:  EXPERIENCES OF SEVEN COUNTRIES IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR FOOD 
SAFETY SYSTEMS (Feb. 2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05212.pdf. 
 63. See World Health Organization, Food Safety, 
http://www.who.int/topics/food_safety/en/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
 64. See Food and Agriculture Organization, Feed and Food Safety 
Gateway, http://www.fao.org/ag/aga/agap/frg/Feedsafety/feedsafety.htm (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2006). 
 65. See Codex Alimentarius, 
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp (last visited Oct. 9 2006). 
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Agreement), resolves trade disputes that involve food safety 
issues, such as the regulation of hormone use in cattle.66 
C. RECENT REGULATION IN RESPONSE TO FOOD TERRORIST 
THREATS 
Consistent with historical patterns of response to food 
crises, the federal government has responded to threats of food 
terrorism by enacting new food law to be applied and enforced 
within the established food regulatory system.  Recent 
regulation has, to a limited extent, altered the United States 
food regulatory system by shifting some power from the states 
to the federal government, granting additional authority to 
federal agencies, particularly to the FDA, and realigning and 
reassigning regulatory authority, particularly from the USDA 
to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  Despite 
these changes, however, interagency cooperation and 
collaboration among stakeholders remains central to the 
regulatory role in minimizing the threat of terrorist activity 
against the food supply. 
1. Bioterrorism Act 
The emerging regulation is largely encompassed in the 
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act).67  The Bioterrorism 
Act has four major provisions related to food.  The first is the 
food facility registration requirement, which requires domestic 
and foreign facilities that manufacture, process, produce, pack, 
or hold food for human or animal consumption in the United 
States to register with the FDA.68  Registering elicits 
information about the food products (brand names and general 
food categories), facility addresses, and contact information.69 
The second major provision is the establishment and 
maintenance of records, which requires firms to keep records of 
 66. See World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2006). 
 67. See Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188 (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 68. See Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894 
(Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20). 
 69. See id. 
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all foods they receive and release.70  These records include 
information regarding the identity of the food, the immediate 
supplier of the food, and the immediate consumer of the food.71  
While federal statutes have allowed FSIS to inspect slaughter 
and processing plant records, FDA has never before had the 
authority to require food processors to keep records or the 
ability to inspect them.72  In the event there is a suspected food 
safety problem, the Bioterrorism Act gives FDA access to 
records including the name and address of facilities’ immediate 
supplier and customer. 
The third major provision of the Bioterrorism Act is the 
prior notice requirement for imported food shipments, which 
requires that entities provide prior notice of all foods for human 
or animal consumption before they enter the United States.73  
Prior notice helps FDA assess whether a shipment will trigger 
an inspection.74 
The fourth major provision is administrative detention, 
which provides procedures for the seizure of foods meant for 
animal or human consumption.75 
These provisions were created largely in response to the 
limited scope of FDA’s authority and are geared toward food 
processors and importers.76 
2. Homeland Security Act 
Another important law is the Homeland Security Act.77  
 70. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public 
Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 
Fed. Reg. 71,561-62 (Dec. 9, 2004) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 11) 
(hereinafter Establishment and Maintenance of Records).  See also Michael T. 
Roberts & Margie Alsbrook, United States Food Law Update, 1 J. FOOD L. & 
POL’Y 187, 199-201 (2005) (generally describing the record-keeping rule). 
 71. See Establishment and Maintenance of Records, supra note 70. 
 72. Vogt, supra note 35, at CRS-16. 
 73. See Prior Notice of Imported Food Under the Public Health Security 
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,974 
(Oct. 10, 2002) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 74. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., HHS 
Issues New Rules to Enhance Security of the U.S. Food Supply (Oct. 9, 2003), 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20031009.html. 
 75. Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal Consumption 
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and 
Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,660 (June 4, 2004) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 1, 10, 16). 
 76. Joseph A. Levitt, CFSAN’s Program Priorities: From Food Safety to 
Food Security, 58 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 19, 24 (2003). 
 77. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 101(a)-101(b), 
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This Act created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and transferred parts of many agencies to the new DHS.78  For 
example, agriculture border inspections were transferred from 
the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS) agency to DHS.79  Section 421 of the Homeland 
Security Act authorized the transfer of up to 3,200 APHIS 
border inspection personnel to DHS.80  As of March 1, 2003, 
approximately 2,680 APHIS inspectors became employees of 
DHS in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP).  
The USDA retained a significant presence in border inspection 
and management of data collected during the inspection 
process because of its scientific expertise.81  APHIS also 
conducts off-shore, pre-clearance inspections at the port of 
origin.82 
3. Presidential Directives 
Following the creation of DHS, President Bush issued a 
series of directives known as “Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives” (HSPD).83  The first of these directives, HSPD-5, 
directs DHS to coordinate development of the new National 
Response Plan that incorporates national prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery plans into a single, all-
hazard plan.84  “HSPD-7 defines USDA and HHS as ‘sector-
specific agencies’ with responsibilities for securing the 
agriculture and food sectors.”85  HSPD-8 sets out a national 
preparedness goal for all hazards, including agriculture.86  The 
most important directive, HSPD-9, instructs the heads of DHS, 
USDA, HHS, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Justice Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
to coordinate their efforts to prepare for, protect against, 
116 Stat. 2135, 2142 (2002). 
 78. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-609, at 63-64 (2002) (combining twenty-two 
agencies into a single Department of Homeland Security). 
 79. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, supra note 77, § 421. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Monke, supra note 7, at CRS-12. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), GAO-05-214, 
HOMELAND SECURITY—MUCH IS BEING DONE TO PROTECT AGRICULTURE 
FROM A TERRORIST ATTACK, BUT IMPORTANT CHALLENGES REMAIN 13 (Mar. 
2005). 
 84. Id. at 19-20. 
 85. Id. at 20. 
 86. Id. 
ROBERTS M. Role of Regulation in Minimizing Terrorist Threats Against the Food Supply: 
Information, Incentives, and Penalties. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):199-223.  
2007] ROLE OF REGULATION 211 
respond to, and recover from an agro-terrorist attack.87  The 
features of HSPD-9 include an integrated diagnostic system, 
animal and commodity tracking systems, vulnerability 
assessments, and coordination with academic communities at 
federal, state, and local levels for capacity-building grants.88  It 
is important to note that HSPD-9 did not create enforceable 
laws.89  Moreover, the viability of HSPD-9 is dependent on 
federal appropriations.90 
4. Additional Regulation 
Additional regulation germane to minimizing the threat of 
food terrorism includes a final rule by APHIS, effective March 
18, 2005, that places additional requirements on laboratory 
facilities that possess, use, transfer, or receive select agents 
capable of causing substantial harm to human, plant, or animal 
health.91 
Similarly, the FDA enacted a feed ban to ensure protection 
against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).  In October 
2005, the FDA published a proposed feed-ban rule to amend the 
agency’s regulations to prohibit the use of cattle origin 
materials in the food or feed of all animals.92  BSE is 
transmitted to cattle when cattle eat BSE-infected tissue.  The 
proposed rule is intended to shore up the FDA regulatory 
protection by keeping the BSE-causing agent out of the animal 
food and feed supply.93 
Additionally, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)94 
acts as a federal “backstop” for certain acts of terrorism via a 
federal program that distributes the risk of loss from foreign 
terrorist attacks between the federal government and the 
                                                          
 87. See Press Release, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9 
(Jan. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040203-2.html. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002: Possession, Use, 
and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,242 (March 18, 
2005) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 331 and 9 C.F.R. pt. 121). 
 92. Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed, 70 Fed. Reg. 
58,570 (proposed Oct. 6, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 589). 
 93. See id. at 58,579-80; see also Press Release, FDA, FDA News:  FDA 
Proposes Additional “Mad Cow” Safeguards (Oct. 4, 2005), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/new01240.html. 
 94. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 
108(a), 116 Stat. 2322 (2002). 
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insurance industry.95  For the Terrorism Risk Insurance to 
apply, terrorist events must meet certain criteria.96 
5. Agency Action 
These laws, regulations, and executive actions are 
significant and contribute to efforts to abate the concern of food 
terrorism.  There is also an impressive “cooperative” regulatory 
food-safety system that has evolved over time.  Hence, it is no 
surprise that the federal regulatory agencies, state agencies, 
the private sector, and the academic community have joined 
together in a collaborative effort on various fronts to reduce the 
threat of food terrorism.97 
Federal food agencies participate with other agencies and 
coordinate activities through the HHS Secretary’s Command 
Center.98  Interagency efforts at this level include agencies 
such as the DHS, the USDA, the FDA, the CIA, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and others.99  Interagency 
conference calls and meetings help facilitate communication 
and collaboration
Coordination has resulted in a number of new 
organizations geared toward addressing the threat of food 
terrorism.  A sampling of these organizations includes: 
● The USDA Office of Food Security and Emergency 
Preparedness Response, which coordinates the 
 95. Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs, Terrorism Risk Insurance, available at 
http://www.nam.org/s_nam/sec.asp?CID=202306&DID=234654. 
 96. Mass. Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation,  Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002 FAQs, 
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=ocaterminal&&L=5&L0=Home&L1=Business&
L2=Insurance&L3=Commercial+Buyers&L4=Terrorism+Coverage&sid=Eoca
&b=terminalcontent&f=_doi_Commercial_Comm_Terr_RiskIns&csid=Eoca 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2007). 
 97. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: 
Strengthening the Security of our Nation’s Food Supply, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0453.shtm. 
 98. See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. and Agency Org. of the 
H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Robert E. 
Brackett, Ph.D., Dir. of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition), 
available at  http://www.fda.gov/ola/2004/foodsafety0330.html. 
 99. See Hearing before the Subcomm. on Research, Nutrition, and Gen. 
Legislation of the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 109th Cong. 
(2006) (Statement of Alex M. Azar, J.D., Deputy Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health and Human Servs.), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t060109.html. 
 100. See id. 
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development of infrastructure and capacity for the 
department to prevent, prepare for, and respond to food 
terrorist attacks.101 
● The FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition’s (CFSAN) Office of Food Safety, Defense, and 
Outreach (OFSDO), which disseminates food safety and 
food defense information to federal partners, state and 
local governments, industry, and consumers.102 
● The USDA steering committee, which develops a 
National Veterinary Stockpile.103 
● The Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) 
established by the FDA and the FSIS.104  It integrates 
state and federal laboratories to analyze food samples 
implicated in threats, terrorist events, or contamination.105 
● The FDA Office of Crisis Management (OCM), which 
coordinates preparedness and emergency response 
activities within the FDA and with federal, state, and local 
counterparts.106 
 Coordination has also led to initiatives involving federal 
agencies and private stakeholders, including the following: 
● An FDA and USDA initiative called the Strategic 
Partnership Program Agroterrorism (SPPA), designed to 
conduct vulnerability assessments in the private sector 
with the CARVER + Shock tool.107  These assessments are 
used to develop strategies and countermeasures to reduce 
potential threats along the farm-to-table continuum.108 
● Food Security Councils, which represent key components 
of the agriculture and food chain, coordinate food defense 
 101. See Press Release, Homeland Security, supra note 97. 
 102. See Interview by Alice Sharp with David Acheson, Director, Office of 
Food Safety, Defense and Outreach, Getting It Out There, FOOD SAFETY, 
available at http://www.gdspublishing.com/ic_pdf/usfs/ofsdo.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2007). 
 103. See GAO HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 83, at 5. 
 104. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food Emergency Response Network – FERN 
(Fiscal Year 2005), available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/Cooperative_Agreements_FERN_2005/in
dex.asp.   
 105. Vogt, supra note 35, at CRS-17. 
 106. Id. 
 107. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Strategic Partnership Program 
Agroterrorism (SPPA) Initiative, (Aug. 2005), 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/agroterr.html. 
 108. See Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, SPPA Questions 
and Answers (Sept. 23, 2005), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/agroter4.html. 
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efforts.109 
● HHS, USDA and joint laboratory networks, which work 
to enhance diagnostic and monitoring capabilities.110 
● Agency-created working groups that fund research to 
address a range of issues.111 
● FDA and USDA guidance documents issued to 
producers, processors, transporters, distributors, and 
consumers to minimize the risk of food terrorism.112 
Partnerships by government agencies have also been 
entered into with academic institutions for food safety centers 
addressing food terrorist threats, including the following:113 
● The University of Minnesota led Homeland Security 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense, which 
works with academia, industry, and government to 
address food defense issues.114 
● Texas A&M University Homeland Security National 
Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense, 
which works with academia, industry, and government to 
address potential threats to animal agriculture.115 
Coordination has involved federal agencies with states at 
various levels, including the following. 
● A DHS award was given to Iowa to establish a multi-
state partnership in the development of food security 
planning initiatives and security strategies to be used as 
guidelines and models for state and local governments.116 
● The USDA created sixteen Area and Regional 
Emergency Coordinator Positions to help states develop 
emergency response plans and serve as a technical 
resource for states and industry.117 
● The Government Coordinating Council, a federally led 
joint federal-state food and agriculture sector team acts as 
a counterpart to the industry Sector Coordinating Council 
 109. Press Release, Homeland Security, supra note 97. 
 110. See GAO HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 83, at 5. 
 111.    Id. 
 112. See Press Release, Homeland Security, supra note 97. 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
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to improve communications and coordination.118 
● Efforts by USDA and state departments of agriculture 
have expedited the planning for a National Animal 
Identification System.119 
● The USDA National Surveillance Unit within APHIS’s 
Veterinary Services program serves as a focal point for the 
collection, processing, and delivery of surveillance 
information.120 
IV. EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO FOOD 
TERRORISM 
One way of evaluating the effectiveness of this hodgepodge 
of new legislation, executive action, and agency coordination is 
to assess its delivery of information, incentives, and penalties.  
This evaluative approach provides an analytical framework 
from which to gauge the government’s response.  This 
evaluation is squared with issues concerning the structure of 
the food regulatory system; a critical inquiry then arises as to 
whether the structure is sufficient to minimize the threat of 
food terrorism. 
A. INFORMATION 
Information is necessary to assess risk, identify problems, 
facilitate coordination, and incorporate traceability capability 
in the multifaceted global food supply and distribution chain.  
Conveying information concerning food terrorism is also 
essential to building and maintaining public trust with 
government.  A fragmented food regulatory system renders the 
gathering and application of information especially challenging. 
Measuring the use of information as a tool raises several 
issues.  What types of information are needed?  How much 
information is needed?  Who has access to the information?  
What is the information used for?  What is the cost of gathering 
the information?  These questions are particularly important 
because irrelevant or inadequate information may generate 
inadequate or even excessive demands for regulation. 
The specific food-defense information tools used by 
government agencies include the essential prongs of the 
Bioterrorism Act: registration, recordkeeping, import notice 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
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and inspection.  These tools enable government agencies to 
obtain information concerning the supply chain.  Collaborative 
efforts by agencies are also designed to obtain and share 
information.  The gathering of this information has helped 
build a more accurate inventory of food distribution and 
enhanced capability to identify and trace food problems.  This 
is especially important given the complex nature of the food 
production and delivery system. 
There are, however, limits to the Bioterrorism Act’s ability 
to gather information.  The Act limits access regarding trade 
secrets and confidential business information.121  Also, 
registration information and information collected under the 
Bioterrorism Act regarding the location of food supplies to 
prevent intentional or unintentional contamination is protected 
from public disclosure by the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).122 
Other information-gathering limitations may not make as 
much sense.  For example, several entities are exempt from the 
registration requirements, namely certain retail stores, non-
profit food and feeding establishments, fishing vessels, trucks, 
and other motor carriers.123  Do these exemptions make sense?  
A farm may pack or hold food without losing its exemption, so 
long as the food is grown, raised, or consumed on that farm or 
another under the same ownership.124  However, if a farm 
packs or holds a neighboring farm’s products, then the farm 
facility must register.125  Does it make sense for registration 
requirements for farms to be predicated upon ownership?  Are 
not non-profit food establishments less of a target for 
terrorists? 
Also of concern are gaps in security at food-processing 
facilities, as reported by a General Accounting Office (GAO) 
 121. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2002). 
 122. Michael T. Roberts & Doug O'Brien, Animal Identification: 
Confidentiality of Information (Fall 2004), 
http://lmic.info/memberspublic/animalID/fs05.pdf. 
 123. See Vogt, supra note 35, at CRS-14. 
 124. Registration of Food Facilities Under the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,894, 
58,905 (Oct. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 20) (supplementary 
information). 
 125. See id. at 58,905-06 (explaining that a packing shed that packs food 
grown or raised on several farms under different ownership is not covered by 
the "farm" definition; thus, such a shed must register) (supplementary 
information). 
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report.126  The report finds that “federal food safety statutes 
provide FDA and USDA with broad authority to regulate the 
safety of the United States food supply but do not specifically 
authorize them to impose security requirements at food-
processing facilities.”127  The report notes that oversight of 
these facilities is governed by voluntary guidelines.128  As 
stated by the report, the government instructs inspectors not to 
enforce implementation of security measures or document any 
observations because of the possible release of information 
under FOIA and potential misuse of the information.129  If 
security gaps at food-processing facilities were made public, 
terrorists could use them as a road map for terrorist activity.130  
The extent of the adoption of voluntary guidelines is 
unknown.131  The report acknowledges that according to trade 
association officials, food processors are voluntarily taking 
steps, including many of the measures suggested by the FDA 
and the FSIS, such as installing fences, requiring that 
employees wear identification, and restricting access to certain 
plant areas.132 
Another GAO report noted problems with coordination and 
communication.  The report points to the DHS’s lack of 
coordination of federal working groups and research efforts.133  
The same report notes the lack of integration of agencies’ 
diagnostic laboratory networks.  This could lead to the HHS not 
receiving timely information from the USDA on agricultural 
diseases that could spread to humans.134  Communication 
problems cited in the report include the limited flow of critical 
information among key stakeholders, such as between the DHS 
and key agriculture states and industry representatives, 
leading to unclear expectations, a lack of clear understanding of 
initiatives in place, and a duplication of efforts.135 
Finally, there is also the consideration of alignment.  It 
 126. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GAO-03-342, FOOD-
PROCESSING SECURITY:  VOLUNTARY EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY, BUT FEDERAL 
AGENCIES CANNOT FULLY ASSESS THEIR IMPLEMENTATION (Feb. 2003). 
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 4. 
 131. Id. at 15. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See GAO HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 83, at 8. 
 134. Id. at 9. 
 135. Id. at 7-8. 
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does not necessarily follow that creating a record-keeping 
burden leads to facilities being better prepared to respond to a 
terrorist activity.  The information certainly is beneficial to 
managing the food system as a whole, but focusing on 
gathering information at the expense of implementing safety 
measures is shortsighted. 
B. INCENTIVES 
In addition to information, incentives are necessary to help 
motivate the food industry to adopt and employ security 
measures to reduce risk of harm from terrorist attacks and to 
encourage cooperation among stakeholders.  Measuring the 
effectiveness of incentives raises several questions.  What are 
the best types of incentives?  How effective are the incentives?  
Are there enough incentives?  Is there too much reliance on 
incentives?  Are the incentives aligned with the goal of 
minimizing terrorist threats?  What are the costs of incentives? 
Although the Bioterrorism Act does include a series of 
grants and incentives to help develop vaccines and antidotes to 
protect food supply, livestock, and crops, the focus of the Act, 
and the existing food regulatory system, is not on the 
development of incentives.  A dearth of regulator-sponsored 
incentives, however, does not mean that the incentives for 
abating food terrorism are lacking.  Indeed, the fragmented 
regulatory approach to food safety constitutes the overarching 
incentive for action.  Government agencies and public and 
private stakeholders work together because there is no other 
option short of restructuring the regulatory agencies if the goal 
is to minimize the threat of terrorist activity against the food 
supply.  Moreover, the self-interest of the food industry drives 
it to cooperate with government agencies in order to protect 
brand image, limit liability, and avoid penalties.  It stands to 
reason, therefore, that the Bioterrorism Act’s record keeping 
requirements can be good for business because it can lead to 
smaller food recalls, which limits liability exposure. 
Should good governance rely on the good will of regulators 
to shore up the regulatory gaps and on the self-interest of 
industry?  Answering this question requires consideration of 
the moral hazard problem.136  The primary concern is that 
 136. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. OF THE U.S., HOMELAND SECURITY 
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 18 (Dec. 2004) available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/60xx/doc6042/12-20-HomelandSecurity.pdf. 
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“[b]usinesses would be inclined to spend less on security than 
might be appropriate for the nation as a whole if they faced 
losses from an attack that would be less than the overall losses 
for society.”137  If this is the case, then the gap between private 
and public costs of a terrorism event can lead to incomplete 
information about the vulnerabilities of the food system and 
under-spending on security, especially when there is unequal 
access to the same information.138  Government can help close 
the gap by internalizing the cost of security through new 
regulations that affect the behavior of the food industry, new 
taxes, or penalties.139  The gap could be further closed by 
regulations which finance the food industry’s efforts to provide 
better information for making security decisions.  These efforts 
could ramp up current efforts to involve the food industry in 
information collection and dissemination, research and 
development, and the provision of additional information on the 
risks of attacks and opportunities to reduce risks to the food 
system.140 
Enthusiasm for developing incentives to generate and 
share additional information should be tempered, however, by 
recognizing the risk of giving terrorists access to information.  
Plus, not all communication provides a social benefit, as there 
may be competitive and even anti-trust concerns in the sharing 
of information across the food industry. 
In addition to the value of information gathering, the 
threat of terrorist activity has underscored the importance of 
developing incentives for the food industry to adopt HACCP 
programs. 141  The food safety system has not provided 
sufficient incentives for food industry to embrace HACCP.142  
Not only does HACCP need to be adopted and utilized more 
fully, but HACCP now needs to be adapted to food terrorism 
programs especially including those involving the surveillance 
of imported foodstuffs.143  Application will help stakeholders 
 137. Id. at 2. 
 138. Id. at 3. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 6. 
 141. Lester Crawford, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 
A Conversation on Food Safety and Global Security, Remarks to the Open 
Forum, U.S. Dep’t of State,  (Sept. 6, 2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/proc/tr/13454.htm. 
 142. See generally Neal D. Fortin, The Hang-Up With HACCP: The 
Resistance to Translating Science Into Food Safety Law, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
565 (2003). 
 143. Crawford, supra note 141. 
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focus on the most likely agents and modalities for 
accomplishing terrorism through the use of the food supply.144  
Implementing and applying HACCP in this manner will 
require extensive cooperation between all relevant food 
industry stakeholders and regulators, including other countries 
and international organizations.145 
Without unduly burdening the private sector, the 
government could develop incentives that either require or 
motivate food processors to take safety measures, beginning 
with basic physical security steps such as installing fences, 
alarms, or outside lighting to improve security. 
C. PENALTIES 
Penalties are designed to reduce the risk of terrorist 
attacks on the food supply by deterring behavior which 
increases the risk of terrorist attacks.  As with information and 
incentives, the use of penalties generates several important 
questions.  Are the penalties effective?  Do the penalties deter 
bad behavior?  To whom are the penalties geared? 
Together, the food regulatory system and new food laws 
enacted in response to the threat of food terrorism present a 
wide array of enforcement tools for regulatory authorities.  
There are several penal tools that are available to the FSIS and 
the FDA in varying degree and scope: warning letters, adverse 
publicity, injunction, retention, seizure, and criminal 
prosecution.146  “These sanctions are not mutually exclusive 
and may build upon one another.”147  Because the FSIS’s 
jurisdiction over meat facilities is built around continuous 
inspection, the agency’s summary powers to withdraw 
inspection services, condemn foods, and obtain plant records 
are as intrusive as those of any government agency over a 
private industry sector.  The FSIS may also detain product in 
the plant, which involves instituting a seizure action 
requesting a federal district court to direct a United States 
Marshal to take custody of the product.148  The FDA’s authority 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Michael T. Roberts, Mandatory Recall Authority: A Sensible and 
Minimalist Approach to Improving Food Safety, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 563, 567 
(2004). 
 147. Id. at 567-68. 
 148. Id. at 567 n.46. 
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under the Bioterrorism Act to detain food under certain 
conditions, namely credible evidence that a shipment presents 
a serious threat, is a first for the agency with respect to food.149  
Notwithstanding the broadening of scope of the FDA’s 
enforcement authority under the Bioterrorism Act, important 
differences between the USDA and the FDA inspection and 
enforcement authorities remain.  For example, the USDA 
corrects problems quickly, whereas the FDA may take longer to 
implement change across all regulated facilities.150  There is 
also a discrepancy with respect to imported foods.  The USDA 
is legally required to inspect certifications from other countries 
while the FDA is not.151 
A recurring and divisive debate over food safety is whether 
there should be mandatory food recall authority to recall unsafe 
food from commerce.  Currently, the federal government does 
not have the authority to recall unsafe food.  Recalls of unsafe 
food are conducted voluntarily by food companies and are 
monitored by either the FSIS with meat products or the FDA 
for other food products.152  Defenders of this voluntary system 
contend that the federal government has sufficient enforcement 
authority and that enacting a mandatory recall authority 
would undermine the cooperative arrangement that exists 
between government and private industry.  The current 
“authority” of the government to compel a recall is due to the 
implicit threat of adverse publicity.153  Is this arrangement 
enough in light of food terrorism?  Should there be a provision 
for immediate notice and recall if terrorism is suspected to have 
rendered a food product unsafe?  If a mandatory food recall was 
instituted, appropriate safeguards could be implemented to 
prevent regulatory overreach.154 
Other improvements are necessary.  As recommended by 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, the FDA 
needs to implement enforcement action for non-compliant firms 
under the feed ban rules.155  It is also important to remember 
 149. See Administrative Detention of Food for Human or Animal 
Consumption Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 31,660 (June 4, 2004) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1, 10, 16). 
 150. See generally id. 
 151. See GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 7. 
 152. Roberts, supra note 146, at 568. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. at 577-82. 
 155. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), GAO-02-183, 
ROBERTS M. Role of Regulation in Minimizing Terrorist Threats Against the Food Supply: 
Information, Incentives, and Penalties. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2006;8(1):199-223.  
222 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 8:1 
 
                                                          
 
that penalties do not work without funding, which is needed for 
increased resources, inspections, and staffing. 
V. STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
An evaluation of the regulatory role of the United States 
federal government in minimizing the threat of terrorist 
attacks against the food supply also requires an appraisal of 
the food regulatory system structure.  This appraisal invariably 
leads to a debate over whether a single food safety entity 
should be created.  Proponents of a single food safety agency 
argue that the existing system is fragmented and ill-equipped 
for meeting the challenges of food safety, including potential 
terrorist attacks on the food supply.156  They assert that a 
single agency would be more focused, and that efficiency in 
delivering information, incentives, and penalties would be 
improved.157 
Opponents of a single food agency believe that the 
cooperative system has historically worked well and that 
moving from a long, settled system to a new entity would 
generate confusion and pose a security threat that would 
outweigh any supposed benefits that would accrue with a single 
agency.158  Despite legislative attempts to establish a single 
federal food safety agency, it is doubtful that proposed 
legislation will gain traction in the near future. 159 
If the current fragmented system remains in place, it will 
be imperative that interagency cooperation and collaboration 
with the various private stakeholders occur at optimal levels.  
Otherwise, the problems associated with information 
gathering, devising incentives for private industry, and 
appropriating meaningful penalties will fail to minimize the 
threat of food terrorism.  Regulators especially should continue 
to work with industry to incorporate considerations of food 
terrorism into food safety management programs.  Policy 
makers should also avoid viewing the Bioterrorism Act as the 
MAD COW DISEASE:  IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ANIMAL FEED BAN AND OTHER 
REGULATORY AREAS WOULD STRENGTHEN U.S. PREVENTION EFFORTS (Jan. 
2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02183.pdf. 
 156. See Hammonds, supra note 30, at 427. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Pape et al., supra note 54, at 405. 
 159. See GAO FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY, supra note 31, at 17-18 (setting forth 
the Bush Administration position in 2002 towards the issue of consolidating 
food safety agencies). 
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regulatory hammer.  While the act gathers useful information 
and allows the government to rapidly track food products 
implicated in a food-borne outbreak, it will not, nor is it 
designed to, deter the intentional contamination of food. 
It will also be imperative for regulators to look for ways to 
improve their preparation and response initiatives to food 
product in a global context.  The WHO should be encouraged to 
continue its helpful role in disseminating information world-
wide to help countries adopt effective domestic regulation and 
to cooperate with each other.  As a global problem, terrorism 
demands global solutions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Examining the regulatory role is critical in responding to 
Tommy Thompson’s charge that the food system is easy prey 
for a terrorist attack. To be fair, the regulatory response to 
threat of food terrorism has been impressive and deserves 
recognition. A realistic appraisal of the three regulatory tools—
information, incentives, and penalties—requires, however, an 
honest appraisal of the inherent limitations and weaknesses of 
the food regulatory system and its dependence on the 
cooperation and coordination of all stakeholders. 
An honest and useful appraisal of the essential regulatory 
tools first raises the question as to the specific purposes for 
information, incentives, and penalties. Measuring the 
effectiveness of these tools to their specific purposes then helps 
identify weaknesses and concerns about not just whether the 
tool is effective, but what steps the government could take to 
reduce further the threat of terrorism against the food system. 
Because these regulatory tools via the Bioterrorism Act 
and other government activity are applied and enforced within 
a long-established food regulatory system, appraisal of this 
system is invariable.  This appraisal hinges on whether the 
cooperation and collaboration by public agencies and the food 
industry that underpins the food regulatory system works. 
Some argue that a single food safety agency would be better 
equipped to meet the challenges of food terrorism threats.  
While minimizing terrorist threats is only part of a larger 
debate about the efficacy of a single food agency, the debate at 
least helps clarify the reasons for the shortcomings of the 
government’s response to terrorist threats against the food 
supply. 
